Enterprises increasingly are deploying Secure Sockets Layer virtual
private networks as alternatives to IPsec. The vendors ranked in the Magic
Quadrant have strengthened, and competition is getting tougher.
Enterprises are shifting their attention from Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec) to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) virtual private networks
(VPNs) for newly provisioned, upgraded, individual remote-access
connections. The flexibility of SSL is so compelling that it overrides
startup cost considerations. Vendors in the SSL VPN market experienced
growth in 2003. Several acquisitions have strengthened the ability of
incumbent leading network vendors to compete in the market, and validate
the case for SSL.
SSL VPNs solve an "80-20" problem for enterprise remote access: 80
percent of users who want remote access will use less than 20 percent of
IT resources and applications through a remote-access connection. However,
if these users are given a full VPN, they will generate more than 20
percent of help desk remote-access calls. Most users primarily are
interested in checking their e-mail and using several key applications
that are tied to online services, such as employee benefits information,
project/order status and corporate news. The menu and application
orientation of an SSL portal is intuitive for users with simple needs, and
it restricts and tracks the resources accessed by remote users. If users
require direct access to enterprise file systems, SSL VPNs can emulate
IPsec via an on-demand redirector.
SSL VPNs will not completely replace demand for IPsec VPNs. IPsec was
designed, and is the best choice, for site-to-site VPNs, alone or in
conjunction with Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol. Also, users may prefer IPsec
clients when they must open long-term, strongly encrypted remote-node
connections for fat-client applications.
Vendor Landscape and Ranking Process
Sixteen vendors are ranked on the Magic Quadrant for SSL VPNs, 1H04
(see Figure 1). At the end of 2003, Gartner sent surveys to 19 vendors,
based on survey history, analyst choices, client feedback and general
industry visibility. The survey requested information about company size,
distribution channels, financials, unit sales and product features (see
"Magic Quadrant Evaluation Criteria for SSL VPNs, 1H04"). Information
obtained since the survey was completed also was considered, but did not
change the vendors' rankings.
Figure 1 Most vendors on the SSL VPN Magic Quadrant are appliance gateway
providers. Pure software products have proved to be less competitive than
drop-in, plug-and-play solutions. Also, most vendors have dropped out of
the managed service business – instead, they resell their SSL VPN products
to managed service providers, such as carriers and service brokers.
NetSilica and Permeo Technologies offer their products as software,
although NetSilica also has an appliance that comprises only a small part
of its business. PortWise offers an appliance and a managed service, which
is priced monthly per user. Aventail is no longer adding end-to-end
managed service customers, although it expects to grow its managed SSL VPN
business by distributing its appliance through service providers.
Leaders
Leaders demonstrate balanced progress and effort on all execution and
vision categories. To remain in the Leaders quadrant, these vendors must
excel in mobile access and protection, as well as maintain or increase
sales.
NetScreen Technologies (which acquired Neoteris, and is being
acquired by Juniper Networks) and Aventail have strengthened their
market positions through concerted efforts to deliver a broad, scalable
range of mobility features, independently and through leveraged
partnerships. NetScreen's sales growth was the best in the market during
2003. Aventail's sales grew with the release of improved appliance models,
and it has succeeded in attracting carriers to adopt its platform.
Aventail also is investing heavily in mobile client alternatives. Aventail
and NetScreen aggressively cultivate relationships with leading
third-party security and policy vendors that enterprises often use for
standard system images.
Nortel Networks jumped from niche player to the edge of the
Leaders quadrant through its work to downsize Alteon into an affordable
enterprise solution that includes a wide range of features for security,
management and roaming, and by migrating IPsec users to SSL. Nortel's new
model sold well for its short time on the market. It is fully compatible
with the larger Alteon and Shasta systems. In 2005, the Magic Quadrant
will be recalibrated to heavily weight managed security and roaming for
SSL endpoint users.
Challengers
Cisco Systems made an extraordinary effort to bring SSL VPN into
its 3000-series VPN platform in 2003. Cisco also developed a good user
interface, although its heritage is back-end systems. The result is an
excellent first-edition product that can be activated on legacy equipment
via a firmware upgrade. Cisco's market clout was more than sufficient to
delay many enterprises' VPN projects following its November 2003 product
launch announcement. We give Cisco credit for taking a strong execution
position to support the SSL VPN market. However, clients report that the
scalability of users per gateway is less than anticipated. As expected
with a first release, the product's basic features and interoperability
with third-party systems can be improved. In particular, Cisco promoted
the idea of running SSL and IPsec simultaneously in an appliance, but
could not overcome the competing resource demands of the two VPNs. To
reach leadership, Cisco must continue to invest in the development of its
WebVPN platform.
Visionaries
Citrix Systems has moved from niche player to visionary by
clarifying the role of its gateway as suited to general SSL VPNs, not just
as an add-on to MetaFrame. Citrix earns vision points by bringing its
extensive expertise with thin clients on multiple platforms to the SSL
market, and adding value to the MetaFrame family. However, it faces the
challenge to deliver MetaFrame sessions on small-screen personal digital
assistants and mobile devices. Cixtrix's execution is good, but its sales
are only to MetaFrame customers. To be considered for leadership, Citrix
must sell strongly outside of the MetaFrame client base, and must adjust
its entry price to compete without MetaFrame. Citrix also would benefit
from building or acquiring an appliance to facilitate entry-level sales.
Nokia entered the SSL VPN market in July 2003 and, at the same
time, strengthened its IPsec end-user product. These moves eliminate the
need to associate Nokia with Check Point Software Technologies –
previously, Nokia's presence in the firewall and VPN markets was mostly
due to its reseller and original equipment manufacturer relationships with
Check Point. Nokia's management features and client integrity checker are
excellent examples of the policy management direction of SSL VPNs. To
reach leadership, Nokia must grow sales and improve its general visibility
to enterprises. It should increase the enterprise appeal of its mobile
platforms as endpoints to use its SSL VPN.
Permeo Technologies' software SSL VPN is new to the Magic
Quadrant. An offshoot of NEC, Permeo has a large installed base but little
visibility. Similar to Whale Communications, Permeo promotes its product
for access to applications. It has made progress in creating user
interface designs that promote a smooth transition for users accustomed to
an IPsec VPN.
PortWise (formerly Lemon Planet) offers a complete mobile
platform for authentication, policy and SSL VPN, and it has the most
experience with small mobile devices among the ranked vendors. Its managed
service is attractively priced, and its execution in limited European
markets is as pervasive as the global execution of other vendors. Its
appliance pricing is competitive with other vendors. PortWise is
well-funded and is trying to understand the buying patterns and cultures
of other world markets. Its fastest path to leadership would be through
acquisition of global sales channels.
Whale Communications moved from niche player to visionary by
concentrating on its core selling point, which is enabling access to
popular applications. Its execution improved by appealing more to the end
user than to security managers (technical sales). Its vision improved as
it clarified and strengthened endpoint security and data cleanup methods.
Whale thus remains a steady, reliable vendor in the market, with growth
potential. Gartner believes that Whale's fastest course to leadership
would be by being acquired by a larger company or by acquiring a company
with established distribution channels.
Niche Players
AEP Systems is new to the Magic Quadrant. Limited visibility,
basic features and good scalability earn it a niche player ranking. Unlike
most other vendors in this Magic Quadrant, AEP pursues the small and
midsize business (SMB) market. It has succeeded with smaller-scale wins.
Array Networks retained a niche ranking for 2004, but rose in
the Niche Players quadrant because of its improved sales, good pricing and
manageability.
F5 Networks' 2003 acquisition of URoam was an early example of a
vendor of back-end SSL stepping into the foreground of the SSL VPN market.
F5's financial strength has improved URoam's execution standing. F5 is
investing in more development, sales efforts and interoperability
partnerships. It has the potential to move higher on vision and execution.
Netilla Networks improved in general execution and has become a
stronger niche player, with expanded commitment to security partnerships.
NetScaler, a competitor to F5, discovered that its user base was
reconfiguring its product for use as an SSL VPN. New to the VPN market,
NetScaler has substantial talent in Web application performance and
security-related features, particularly involving ActiveX. Similar to F5,
NetScaler can improve its execution scores by growing sales, and can
improve its vision scores by incrementally expanding client and management
features.
NetSilica has the lowest priced products among the ranked
software SSL VPN products and a good discount progression. Because the
prevailing market demand is for appliances, this architecture merits a
niche ranking. Gartner clients are generating sufficient interest in
NetSilica to assure its continued tracking in the Magic Quadrant.
Symantec acquired SafeWeb in 2003. It has rebranded the product
to sell alongside its IPsec VPN gateway, which has done well in SMB sales.
In addition to a low entry price, Symantec brings a strong value
proposition to the SSL VPN market because of the strength of its
LiveUpdate service, and its history in antivirus software and personal
firewalls. Symantec likely will move into the Visionaries quadrant when it
releases thin-client/on-demand versions of its personal security products
to bolster its SSL VPN.
Not on the Magic Quadrant
Three vendors did not reply to the survey, although they are still in
business: OpenReach, Seagull Software Systems and
Tarantella. These vendors have viable products that can be
considered for future deployments.
Aspelle has gone out of business by the decision of its primary
investor, Dresdner Bank. (Gartner will put enterprises that use Aspelle's
products in touch with Aspelle's former developer on request.) Check
Point was excluded because it withdrew its first SSL product from the
market in 2002, and its new product will be released too late to be
considered for this research.
Vendors that offer viable SSL VPN products, but were not contacted for
this survey because a lack of client inquiries and market influence,
include: Authentor Systems, Novell, Plumtree Software, Positive Networks,
Rainbow Technologies, Sun Microsystems, TrueDisk and V-One.
Key Findings
Endpoint security is a primary selection driver for SSL VPNs. Although
enterprises appreciate SSL's portability, they are alarmed at the risks of
access from unmanaged, and unmanageable, endpoint systems. In 2004,
partial integrated data cleanup and partnerships with early independent
software vendors of on-demand firewalls is acceptable. However, in 2005,
enterprise buyers will expect deeply integrated personal firewalls and
support for 802.1x authentication.
Price was not a primary selection driver in 2003. The flexibility and
ease of administering SSL VPN users has held greater appeal than product
entry price. In 2004, buyers are starting to think of SSL VPN as a
commodity feature. High prices for entry and per concurrent session can't
be defended in the long term by dividing them against the anticipated
number of users, because buyers are becoming more knowledgeable, and more
skilled, in their spending patterns.
Gartner clients didn't cite benchmark scores as a major differentiator
in their buying decisions in 2003. The few benchmark studies that were
published were hotly contested and reinterpreted by each vendor. Vendors
from the accelerator markets, such as NetScaler and F5, should cultivate
an independent benchmarking method and agency that models enterprise user
patterns.
SSL's role in mobile roaming access is misunderstood. SSL VPN sessions
don't require an IP address for authentication, and don't require a mobile
IP address to support roaming. Vendors have underestimated the importance
of roaming. By 2005, demonstrations of good roaming solutions will be
critical to win business.
Bottom Line: The simplicity and portability of Secure Sockets
Layer virtual private networks can lower the cost to implement remote-user
VPNs for corporate workstations, as well as access from noncorporate
systems such as PCs. Where traditional VPNs are not required, expect
immediate value from investments in SSL VPNs in the form of easier
deployment and support.
Gartner RAS Core Research NoteM-22-5198, J. Girard,
13 April 2004.
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quadrant. The Magic Quadrant is Gartner, Inc.'s opinion and is an
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